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1Abstract
In the context of the US anti-narcotic program, ‘Plan Colombia’, during the first decade of 
the 21st century, special agents of the US Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) took position 
in the heart of the Colombian penitentiary administration. Their task was to lead a profound 
reform of the sector, based on the US ultra-punitive penal regime and its ‘supermax’ 
housing units. Based on extensive fieldwork with prison architects, inmates and other 
actors in the penal systems of the US and Colombia, this paper analyzes how the reform 
was set up on the ground, shedding light on the partially divergent interests and 
expectations of both governments within the neocolonial context of ‘Plan Colombia’. We 
show how, on the one hand, the reform partially succeeded in militarizing carceral life and 
deurbanizing the prison system, spatially isolating inmates from their social and family 
environment. On the other hand, we show that the reform eventually failed, for institutional 
and political reasons, to meet its declared goal of modernizing Colombian prisons. From a 
more theoretical perspective and drawing on recent literature on the mobility of policies 
and built forms, the paper argues that the introduction of supermax prisons in Colombia is 
a striking case where a mobile policy and a traveling architectural type coincided and 
complemented each other, and suggests that in order to advance our understanding of 
how space is produced in a global arena, interconnections between circuits of policy and 
architectural mobilities should be more systematically considered.
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2Introduction
In 1999, US President Bill Clinton launched ‘Plan Colombia’, an episode in the long history 
of US intervention in Latin America. In the post-World War II era, the Colombian 
government had been a constant and faithful ally of US government’s Latin American 
policy, first in its war against communism and then, from the 1970s onwards, against 
drugs, of which Plan Colombia was part. Between 1999 and 2010, the US government 
injected $7.3 billion USD into this program, which made Colombia one of the largest 
targets of US aid in the world (Isacson, 2010) and put it under the de facto tutelage of the 
US government (Pécaut, 2000). Most of these investments were used for military action 
and the destruction of coca fields. In Plan Colombia, the reform of Colombian prisons – the 
focus of this paper – is only a small budgetary line1 and generally a disregarded aspect of 
it. But it has profoundly reshaped the world of Colombian prisons. As part of this reform
advised by the US Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 16 new prisons were built along the 
lines of the US prison model, increasing the capacity of the Colombian prison system by 
almost 70%. Amongst the 30,545 beds provided in the new facilities, 1,000 to 1,500
correspond to punishment cells of the ‘Special Treatment Units’ (Unidad de Tratamiento 
Especial – UTE) directly inspired by ‘supermax’ security blocks developed in the US during 
the 1990s, characterized by a quasi-total isolation of prisoners, sensorial deprivation and 
minimal interaction between prisoners and warders. This reform that drastically hardened 
detention conditions and militarized the country’s penitentiary culture, supplemented the
‘punitive turn’ in criminal justice policies initiated in Colombia in the mid-1990s. From this 
period on, the Colombian government created prolific new offenses in the penal code and 
stiffened penalties for minor infringements committed by the poorest sectors of the 
population (Reed Hurtado, 2012). As a result, in less than 20 years, the Colombian prison
population increased fourfold (39,676 inmates in 1996 to 120,032 in 2013, according to 
official prison statistics) (INPEC 2013; 2014). Two decades after the United States, 
Colombia in turn entered the era of mass incarceration. The primary aim of this paper is to 
shed light on the process through which the US prison model was introduced in Colombia 
and on the effects of this process on the penal system of this country. Drawing on 
literature dealing with traveling policies (Peck and Theodore, 2010; McCann and Ward, 
2011; McFarlane, 2011; Robinson 2013) and built forms (Nasr and Volait, 2003; King, 
2004; Guggenheim and Söderström, 2010; Faulconbridge, 2010; Jacobs and Lees, 2013),
it also aims to better understand the parallels and divergences between the circuits of 
policy and architectural mobility. Policies and built forms travel sometimes independently: 
drug policies or legal ideas can move (McCann, 2008; Langer, 2007) without being 
accompanied by a specific built form. Conversely for example, the import of the shopping 
mall-type in a new context does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a policy change 
(Söderström, 2014). Furthermore, the transnational circuits of policies and forms can differ 
in terms of actors, spaces of circulation, economic interests, etc. But in the case of the 
supermax in Colombia, changes in the penal policy and changes in the architecture of 
prisons are congruent and complementary. The supermax prison gives material form to an 
ultra-punitive penal regime where security and punishment predominate over any other 
function (such as re-education or dissuasion) associated with the imprisonment of 
perpetrators of what a jurisdiction considers as a crime. This penal regime was developed 
in the US in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the aims of Plan Colombia was to export it to 
Colombia. The US-led reform of Colombian prisons is therefore a strong example of a 
       
1 Between 1999 and 2012, the US government invested $140M USD in the Colombian justice sector, of 
which $7M were used for the provision of technical assistance in the penitentiary system (US Embassy in 
Colombia, 2012). 
3mobile policy and a ‘traveling’ architectural type aiming to radically reshape the application 
of the law, the behavior of prisoners and warders and the architecture of prisons. 
Methodologically, it thus leads to the following questions: How do different policies and 
forms complement each other? Do they follow the same routes? Are they put in circulation 
by the same actors? These are some of the methodological questions raised by this case 
study.2
In this paper, we argue that the journey to Colombia of the US penal regime and its 
architectural icon – the supermax – has been of critical importance in the rise of mass 
incarceration in the country. We also show that the introduction of US-inspired prisons in 
Colombia inaugurated a unprecedented pattern of isolation operating at different levels: on
a regional scale, with the relocation of a large part of the prison population in ‘deurbanized’
correctional facilities where contacts with the social and family environment are drastically 
weakened or destroyed; and on a local scale, through an architectural and normative
arrangement aiming to break the collective dynamics and eliminate the significant margin 
of freedom that characterized the Colombian prison system. However, we argue, the 
reform did not succeed in wiping out the traditional (or ‘criolla’) prison culture, based on 
social bonds of inmates within and outside of the prison, and that it eventually failed. Our 
analysis shows that the divergent interpretations of the prison reform’s ‘program of action’ 
by the US and Colombian governments – two States whose relations were marked by an 
asymmetry of power in the neocolonial context of Plan Colombia – and the heterogeneous
nature of ‘institutional spaces’ between US and Colombian carceral milieus are the main 
reasons of this failed transfer.
This paper draws on extensive fieldwork both in the US and Colombia between 2009 and 
2011, at a time when some of the US-inspired prisons were already functioning and others 
were still under construction in Colombia. As for most scholars engaging with prisons, the 
question of access was a crucial methodological challenge for this study. Fieldwork in 
prison studies has become rather rare in the last 30 years, first because prisons, in many 
countries, have turned into highly bureaucratic and opaque institutions that are very 
difficult to penetrate to conduct inquiry and, second, because funding agencies and 
universities today are reluctant to support long-term and sometimes ‘risky’ field research in 
prisons (Rhodes 2001: 72; Wacquant, 2002: 387). However, these obstacles can be 
overcome, as evidenced by the new and fast-developing geographic scholarship focusing 
on spaces of incarceration and confinement in the era of ‘new punitiveness’ (Pratt et al., 
2011) in a variety of countries (Bear, 2005; Dirsuweit, 2005; Moran et al. 2013; Moran, 
2015; Peck and Theodore, 2008; Sibley and Van Hoven, 2008). For the present research, 
the difficulties in gaining broad access to prisons were circumvented thanks to the 
collaboration with a Colombian NGO specialized in the monitoring of human rights in 
detention facilities and humanitarian assistance to prisoners in Colombia3.
Methodologically, the study is based on documentary analysis, statistical data, 50 visits to 
a broad range of Colombian prisons (including supermax ‘UTE’ wings), as well as in-depth 
interviews with prisoners, former prisoners, family members, prison officers, prison 
directors, human rights defenders and penal reform lobbyists. Additionally, a series of 
interviews were conducted with prison architects and entrepreneurs in the US. 
We develop our analysis in three steps: we first situate our study within the recent 
literature on mobile policies and built forms, arguing for a comparison between different 
circuits of a relational processes of space production; we then analyze the reform of the 
       
2 This means that we do not focus on prison design per se but rather on its transnational circulation. 
3 Colombian Non Governmental Organization ‘Fundación Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos Políticos’ (see 
CSPP, 2013). 
4Colombian penal and penitentiary system during the first decade of the 21st century by 
describing its political context, deconstructing the process through which reform took place 
and highlighting some of its consequences. In the final part of our paper, we argue for a 
broader view of relations in the analysis of processes of space production.
From policy mobility to relational space production
Since the early 2000s a series of publications studying the mobility of public policies in 
geographical space have developed new understandings of policymaking in an age of fast-
paced globalization (Peck and Theodore, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2011; McFarlane,
2011; Robinson, 2013). In discussing policy mobility instead of transfer – a term generally 
used in political science – geographers have highlighted the selective, power-laden, 
spatially complex and often unpredictable process through which policies travel (McCann 
and Ward, 2010; McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011). Pursuing and deepening the debate, other 
authors have in turn recently questioned the concept of mobility, with its material 
connotations, as a limited concept for grasping the variegated ways in which a policy in 
one place can be influenced by a policy somewhere else (Allen and Cochrane, 2010; 
Robinson, 2013). It has been suggested that researchers need to use a repertoire of 
different conceptual descriptors and methodologies in order to capture the material, 
immaterial, imaginative and sometimes elusive ways in which policies cross geographical 
spaces (Roy and Ong, 2011; Söderström and Geertman, 2013). The debates on how to 
make sense of policies on the move also stretches beyond the boundaries of geography. 
Other fields of research – in particular urban history with studies of inter-municipal 
exchanges (Saunier, 2002; Saunier and Ewen, 2008); and planning theory with studies of 
cross-border planning practices (Saunier, 2002; Nasr and Volait, 2003; Saunier and Ewen, 
2008; Healey and Upton, 2010; Healey, 2012) – have dealt with similar (or quasi-similar) 
processes for a long time. An emergent dialogue across these research fields is opening 
the possibility for greater thematic breadth and historical depth in policy mobility studies 
(Clarke, 2012; Harris and Moore, 2013). This conversation is also potentially fruitful as it 
brings together, as Cook et al. (2014) remark, theoretically sophisticated work in 
geography with empirically rich work in other disciplines.
In geography, urban history and planning theory, the focus is on policies and how 
municipalities, planners and other experts are involved in the business of policymaking 
beyond the place in which they primarily intervene (a specific city, region or country). 
However, city relations are not restricted to policies, but include a wide range of 
exchanges from business to social movements or lifestyles (Söderström, 2014). In this 
paper, we argue that in order to grasp contemporary dynamics of space production, the 
scope should be widened further to include work focusing on the geographies of 
architecture. Built forms in different cities are indeed connected through the mobility of 
architectural types or models, as another strand of research in geography and urban 
studies has demonstrated (King, 1984; King, 2004; Jacobs, 2006; McNeill, 2009; 
Faulconbridge, 2010; Guggenheim and Söderström, 2010; Faulconbridge, 2012; Jacobs
and Lees, 2013). This literature highlights processes that in many ways are similar to 
those described by policy mobility studies showing, for instance, that intermediaries such 
as professional journals or local experts play an important role in the mobility of built forms 
and that forms are adapted during their ‘travel’ rather than simply copied off the shelf. 
At the same time, we also highlight the differences between the logics governing policies 
and built forms on the move in terms of actors, circuits, motivation and effects. This will 
allow us to reflect in the conclusion on the convergences and divergences between these 
5transnational relations and thereby to put these two strands of literature in conversation at 
a methodological and conceptual level. More generally, we suggest that the type of 
broadly-designed comparative research developed in this paper points to the necessity of 
aiming at a synthetic understanding of how space is relationally produced, thus moving 
beyond too narrow a focus on connections in terms of policies, forms or urban cultures.
As our paper looks simultaneously at the circulation of a penal policy and of a prison 
model, it quite naturally draws on conceptual resources from both policy mobility studies 
and geographies of architecture. Concepts such as, ‘globalized micro-spaces’ of 
negotiation – stemming from policy mobility studies (McCann, 2011: 118-119) – and 
‘institutional embeddedness’ (Faulconbridge, 2012: 340) – stemming from the geography 
of architecture, are thus used to make sense of the empirical phenomenon on which this 
paper focuses.
According to McCann (2011: 120), the concept of globalized micro-spaces refers to ‘key
relational sites that are central to the social process of teaching and learning about policy’.
Those sites - such as meeting, conferences, on-site visits, workshops, award ceremonies 
and other networking events – are important nodes in the global circulation of policy 
knowledge ‘where trust is developed, where reputations are made or unmade … and 
where acquaintances, or “weak ties,” are made among copresent conferees’ (McCann 
2011: 118-120). Among the main globalized micro-spaces are fieldtrips associated with 
‘policy tourism’ (Ward, 2011; Cook et al. 2014; Gonzalez, 2011) - i.e. policy experts 
travelling to particular host places to share experiences or fact-finding visits to specific 
places - as well as meetings and conferences that include ‘micro-scale activities of policy 
packaging, communicating and persuading’ (Jacobs 2012: 414). As we will see below, 
such globalized micro-spaces played a central role in the ‘mobility’ of the US prison 
system.
If attention to these spaces allows an understanding of mechanisms facilitating policy and 
architectural mobilities, the notion of institutional embeddedness draws our attention to
how heterogeneous institutional contexts create frictions in these mobilities. Recently, 
scholars have paid more attention to the role of institutions, highlighting the fact that 
policies and built forms do not smoothly travel across spaces regulated by different legal, 
administrative, political and cultural systems (Faulconbridge 2012; Healey, 2013). In this 
context, Faulconbridge (2012; 242) suggests it is essential to have a broad definition of 
‘institutions’:
‘Existing studies define institutions as both formal rules and regulations set by 
recognized authorities in a particular institutional field, and the informal norms, 
customs and traditions that support and result from formal rules … Together these 
two dimensions of institutions are said to influence the priorities, behaviors and 
decision-making of actors’.
Using such a wide analytical angle, we will show that the institutional divergences between 
Colombia and the US in the penitentiary domain are crucial to an explanation of why this 
part of Plan Colombia eventually failed. Informal norms of the prison institution – or to put it
in other terms, the cultural habits of the criolla prison – played as we show below a major 
role in preventing a full conversion to the US model. Criolla prison culture, expressed by
the routine practices, discourses and representations of all the agents of the Colombian 
prison system (including prisoners, warders and prison authorities), could not be 
transformed by decree. It was only temporarily dampened during the years the BOP and 
local authorities attempted to transfer the US maximum security blueprint to Colombia and
then made its way back.
6New penology and mass imprisonment in the US
Since the second half of the 1970s, the United States has been the birthplace of a drastic 
shift in the field of crime control, towards ultra-repressive ‘law and order’ policies. This 
‘punitive turn’ (Wacquant, 2010) represents not only a new trend in policies, but also a 
profound cultural change. What David Garland (2001a) named the ‘culture of control’ 
elevates safety from crime – and related themes such as zero-tolerance and war on 
drugs – to the highest priorities of government as well as people’s concerns and public 
debate. In addition, US neoconservative thoughts, practices and policies regarding crime 
control, far from being a domestic issue, have become highly influential on a global scale. 
Scholars have described the international convergence and homogenization of security 
and penal policies following the American example, highlighting the role of US think tanks, 
transnational networks of experts, professional associations and international conferences 
in this process of worldwide influence (Christie, 1994; Garland, 2001a; Peck, 2003; 
Wacquant, 2004; Newburn and Sparks, 2004; Melossi, Sozzo and Sparks, 2011).
One of the key impacts of this ultra-repressive scheme has been to push the United States 
into an age of mass imprisonment (Garland, 2001b), a phenomenon without precedent in 
the history of contemporary democratic societies (Wacquant, 2005; 2009a; 2009b). After 
decades of stability in the incarceration rate, the breakneck pace of growth in the prison 
sector since the late 1970s took all observers unawares. The number of prisoners in the 
US rose from 379,000 in 1975 to 2,267,000 in 2010 (i.e. a 600% growth over 35 years) 
and that same year, reached a record of 730 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants (Wacquant, 
2009a: 136; Pew Center on the States, 2012). The US prison sector not only changed 
dramatically in scale, but also in nature. From the 1980s onwards, the objective of 
rehabilitation was progressively abandoned and replaced by other fundamental 
justifications for prisons: punishment, deterrence and incapacitation (Garland, 2001a: 61). 
This was not only a rhetorical change, but also had material implications that led to a 
profound transformation of the correctional world in the US. Prisons were increasingly built 
in remote rural areas and prisoners subjected to draconian rules, permanent supervision,
harsh treatment and geographical, social and emotional isolation (ADPSR, 2004; Gilmore 
2007). In the spirit of the law, as well as in the architectural design and internal rules of the 
facilities, security became the absolute priority above and beyond all other considerations. 
Security also became the ‘trademark’ that distinguished US experts and builders among 
the well-informed circles of the global prison industry4.
Among the recent transformations in prison design, the super-maximum security prison
(‘supermax’) is emblematic, as it materializes in built form the punitive turn in criminal 
justice policies. This prison model spread in the United States between the late 1980s and 
the late 1990s, at the height of the carceral boom (Reiter, 2013). Officially named ‘Secure 
Housing Units’ (SHUs), supermaxes operate like prisons within prisons. They are stand-
alone facilities or special housing wings built inside larger state and federal prison 
complexes, and held, in 2013, about 20,000 prisoners who cannot allegedly be controlled 
in the general prison population (mostly Latin-American gang members condemned to 
lengthy prison sentences) (Ross, 2013: 11; Reiter, 2012: 550). People detained in 
supermax facilities are subjected to long-term solitary confinement under conditions of 
radical sensory deprivation (Kurki and Morris, 2001). They remain in their cells for 24 
hours a day, except for brief solitary exercise periods or in order to shower, they are 
exposed to permanent artificial light and have little or no human contact for weeks, months 
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prison population of the country, the supermax is of symbolic importance, as it has 
become the architectural icon of the new regime of ultra-punitiveness in the US. In the light 
of the mass worldwide influence of US penal thinking and policy, it is hardly surprising that 
the supermax has played a role in the exportation of the US prison model, as we show 
below.
Exporting the US prison
While the ideas and practices of the ‘culture of control’ have crossed borders and greatly 
influenced penal policies worldwide in the last quarter of a century, the international 
mobility of the US prison model – a phenomenon almost ignored in the scholarship on 
circulating criminal policies to date – started to increase markedly in the 2000s, through 
two separate and complementary corporate and governmental circuits. On the one hand,
after the domestic prison market started to dry up following the slight but continuous drop 
in the US national prison population since 2009 (Pager and Phelps 2011), a ‘for-profit 
circuit’ – clearly trade-oriented – has mobilized categories of agents such as the architects 
and planners of the powerful US correctional industry, as well as companies producing 
prison security devices, to redirect part of their business strategies toward the acquisition 
of overseas markets5. On the other hand, a ‘state circuit’, led by the US government or its 
agencies (Federal Bureau of Prisons - BOP, National Institute of Correction, and State 
Department), operates through the transfer of the US prison model during armed
intervention abroad, in the context of the global ‘war on drugs’ and ‘war on terror’. In this 
military context, deployment of correctional facilities inspired by US architectural standards 
and disciplinary regimes is mostly aimed at neutralizing the threats to US 'vital interests'. 
Thus, all major US military interventions in foreign countries occurring since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century – Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Plan Merida in Mexico – have 
included a carceral component; the facilities of Guantánamo (Ross and Rothe, 2013) and 
Abu Ghraib (Rothe, 2013) being by far the most publicized cases. The prison facilities built 
in Colombia in the context of the US anti-narcotic program in the 2000s are clearly also 
part of this second circuit of exportation.
The state and the for-profit exportation circuits do not have the same objectives and do not 
involve the same key actors; however, multiple collaborations, encounters and friendships 
connect the public and the private sectors engaged in the US correctional world. Agents 
from the prison industry, civil servants and authorities from prison administration converge 
in different ‘globalized micro-spaces’ (McCann, 2011: 118-119) that play a key role in 
policy mobilities. In the for-profit circuit, for example, conferences such as the annual 
meeting of the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) are essential for 
the US private sector to re-enforce its position in the global correctional market and obtain 
new contracts abroad. Bringing together private actors and representatives of local and 
national prison administrations from 90 countries, the ICPA has become a focal point for 
the international circulation of policies, practices, business models material devices and 
architectural types related to penal confinement, as well as the incubator of profitable 
contracts for prison entrepreneurs (ICPA, 2010, 2014).
       
5 See, for instance, the building of Ezeiza Federal Prison in Argentina by US multinational corporation 
AECOM, or the public contracts for prison design and building won by the leading US correctional planning 
and design company CGL in Mexico, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (interviews with US prison 
architects and entrepreneurs, 17.06.2011; 20.06.2011). 
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micro-space of persuasion was the site visits both in the US and in Colombia. Short trips to 
US prisons for Colombian civil servants were organised by Washington in the early 2000s,
and, in turn, US experts of the BOP were invited for a long-term stay in Colombia to bring 
technical assistance. A participant in the Colombian delegation invited to visit five prisons 
in the United States explained the impact of a trip in 2004 in the following terms:
‘The Americans showed us that everything must function according to a strict 
procedure and that any kind of space must be designed for that purpose. While 
analyzing the architecture and the buildings’ typology, we could see that everything
was functional. When we got back to Colombia, we took all this information, we 
consulted the national penitentiary law and we reconfigured our own model’6.
Similarly, the long-term stay of US experts in the heart of the Colombian prison 
administration was an important part of the transfer process, as the next section shows.
The US prison in Colombia: one script, different motivations
In 2000 and 2001, the transfer process of the US prison model was planned jointly by the 
US and Colombian governments and was ratified in a bilateral agreement known as the 
‘Improvement Program for the Colombian Prison System’, which was included in the 
broader framework of Plan Colombia (Agreement, 2000; 2001). In order to comprehend 
the workings of the policy mobility process, it is useful to borrow from the extended 
metaphor of the ‘script’ developed in Actor Network Theory (Akrich, 1992). A script is a 
scenario or program of action inscribed in a technology or artifact. A ‘script analysis’ of an
innovation ‘follows’ a program of action from its conception to its inscription in technologies 
or artifacts and finally to its adoption or rejection by its users. This concept can be applied 
in an enlightening way to travelling policies and built types (Söderström 2013).
In Colombia, the script of the new prison system was broadly contained in the essence of 
Plan Colombia: that is, in the implementation of ultra-punitive ‘tough-on-crime’ policies 
especially regarding counter-narcotic and counter-terrorism issues. This program of action 
set out a series of measures that were inscribed in the bilateral Agreement settling 
different aspects of the technical input of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of the 
United States in the Colombian prison sector. According to the Agreement, the BOP was 
tasked with advising on: the design, construction, equipment, and internal rules of new 
high security facilities; upgrading of security levels in the facilities; redesigning the training 
program in the national penitentiary school; the creation and training of new special groups 
of commandos within the Colombian National Institute of Prisons (INPEC); and the 
formation and training of intelligence groups, auditors and instructors. Additionally, this 
program of action prescribed the implementation of a new architectural model. Financially, 
the US government only funded technical aid by the BOP experts’ delegation, as well as 
some computing and security devices, while Bogota was accountable for the largest
investments in the prison sector, such as Colombian personal expenses, building costs, 
equipment and maintenance (Agreement, 2000; 2001).
From many possible examples provided by the US penitentiary building stock, the BOP 
chose the Maximum Security Prison at the Coleman Federal Correctional Complex in 
Florida as a model to be reproduced in Colombia, as BOP liaison agents in Colombia 
explained in a laudatory report published in specialized press in 2002 (Wilkey and Rivera, 
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INPEC, Bogota, 20.05.2011.  
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than the ideal of cooperation described by the BOP at this time would suggest. Although 
the content of the transfer was engraved in the letter of the Agreement and the choice of 
the architectural design of Coleman, a closer analysis of the process reveals that, because 
of their respective political context and interests, the interpretation of the script differed 
depending on the points of view of actors at both ends of the process.
For the US government, building more stable judicial institutions and secure detention 
facilities in Colombia was a compelling necessity in order to get Colombian drug traffickers 
(and to a lesser extent, guerilla leaders) prosecuted and eventually extradited to the US, 
where they were recognized as criminals in the eyes of US law. Indeed, according to the 
US Embassy in Colombia, between 1999 and 2011, at least 1,200 drug offenders were
extradited to the USA, where most of them have been tried, and condemned to harsh 
sentences (Caracol Radio, 2011). It was thus in Washington’s interests to build high 
security prisons, from which it was almost impossible to escape, so that prisoners would 
remain safely in custody during months or years before their extradition to the United 
States.
From the Colombian perspective, the Agreement raised broader expectations. Beyond the 
will to please Washington, Bogota perceived US aid as an opportunity to ‘modernize’ its 
penitentiary system and put an end to the endemic crisis of prisons, plagued by 
nightmarish conditions of overcrowding, disrepair and insecurity. At the end of the 1990s, 
the Colombian government was not only under pressure from the United States – it also 
had to face strikes by prison staff and mutinies by prisoners. Additionally, in 1998, the 
Constitutional Court declared the whole prison system unconstitutional, due to systematic 
violations of the inmates’ fundamental rights (Corte constitucional de Colombia, 1998), a 
situation exacerbated by the explosion of the prison population that started in the mid-
1990s. According to governmental messages addressed to Parliament, the US 
intervention in penitentiary affairs was aimed at nothing less than wiping the slate clean 
and launching a new model of order and security, inspired by the American model. The 
Colombian government even harbored ambitions to position the country at the top of the 
most modern prison administrations in the continent (Ministerio de Justicia de Colombia,
2000). The very name of the reform, ‘New Prison Culture’ (Nueva Cultura Penitenciaria), 
reflected this will to revolutionize prison policies: it was not merely the introduction of a few 
practices and architectural changes; rather the goal was to achieve fundamental 
transformation of the penitentiary culture. Despite the importance of this issue, prison 
reform and collaboration with the BOP were carried out in a discrete - almost secret - way 
by the Colombian government. The Agreement was never submitted to the national 
Parliament and the government directly managed the prison reform with discretionary 
powers, without having to account to Congress at any point.
Soon after the signing of the first part of the Agreement in 2000, a delegation of BOP 
experts was sent to Bogota. They rapidly gained considerable influence, such that they 
became a kind of hidden management board within the Colombian prison administration, a 
position they held until they left Colombia in 2005. This status is reflected in the comments 
of several agents within the INPEC, notably a leader of the Warders’ Trade Union:
‘We all knew that the key figure in the INPEC was J. [the chief of BOP delegation]. 
Everybody knew perfectly well that the prison system was managed from the [BOP 
office in INPEC’s headquarter], at least for the main strategic issues. The employees 
used to go to his office to ask for personal favors, due to his influence’7.
       
7 Interview with a leader of Colombian Warders’ Trade Union, Bogota, 05.08.2011. 
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In terms of policy mobility, this is therefore a case where far from having a symmetrical 
relation between municipalities or nation states, we have officials of a foreign government 
creating an enclave in another country to directly steer the implementation of a new policy 
within very asymmetrical international power relations.
Between 2000 and 2003, the design of Coleman Prison inspired the construction of six 
large high security ‘New Prison Culture’ facilities of 1,600 beds each in different regions of 
the country (high security prisons of Valledupar, Cómbita, Acacias, La Dorada, Giron and 
Popayan) that were officially classified as ‘2nd generation’ prisons. As generally happens in 
policy mobility processes, the original model was not literally copied. Rather, the general 
high security features of the Coleman penitentiary were taught to the Colombian 
authorities. 
In 2003, despite the opening of 10,000 new beds in the six new prisons, the Colombian 
government admitted that, contrary to what had been promised, the rate of overcrowding 
had not been reduced. The sustained growth of the number of prisoners resulting from
increasingly severe penal laws had by far exceeded the pace of construction. In 2004, on 
the advice of the BOP, Colombia began to design ten ‘3rd generation’ prisons – carceral 
mega-complexes designed to hold up to 4,300 inmates each, that include on a single very 
large site, separate facilities with different security levels (low, medium and high security).
Ten of those mega-complexes were built after the BOP had left Colombia in 2005 (See 
figure 1). Despite the unprecedented proliferation of prisons during the years of the ‘New 
Prison Culture’ reform, the new constructions never could keep pace with the dramatic 
growth of the prison population resulting from the massive incarceration of minor 
offenders. As with the ‘penalisation of poverty’ that occurred in the United States since the 
end of the 1970s (Wacquant 2009a; 2009b), the punitive turn that started in Colombia in 
the mid-1990s clearly targeted the poorest fractions of the population. Statistics on 
education levels among the prisoners in Colombia clearly bear this out. Almost half of the
inmates (45%) have received no education after primary school (5 years of schooling)
(INPEC 2012), an education rate by far below the national average (World Bank 2011).
From criolla culture to a pattern of isolation
A central aim of the ‘New Prison Culture’ was to get rid of the old habits of the traditional or 
‘criolla’ prison culture, which was based on flexibility, as well as geographical and social 
integration. Borrowing the emic notion of criolla, broadly used by Colombians in everyday 
speech to mean ‘typical of our own land’ or ‘distinctive of our culture’, we define the criolla
prison culture as a set of culturally-embedded practices forged over the twentieth century 
that considerably improved quality of life behind bars by limiting the depersonalization and 
the desocialization inherent to imprisonment, despite dreadful conditions of infrastructure 
deterioration, poor management, corruption and insecurity. Criolla carceral culture can be 
defined by four characteristics: firstly, prisoners’ communal and self-managed lifestyle; 
secondly, a significant margin of dialogue and negotiation between the prison population 
and the prison management; thirdly, the preservation of regular and intimate contact with 
family (notably through a sort of ‘open day’ each week-end, with tens of thousands of 
visitors, including children, entering for long hours the living spaces of prisoners); and 
fourthly, the geographical location of the prisons in accessible sites within urban areas.
Criolla prisons were certainly designed to punish penal offenders, but not to radically 
exclude them from society. The New Prison Culture’s blueprint of isolation abruptly 
collided with this older institutional framework and represented a dramatic change, as it 
inaugurated an unprecedented phase of extremely severe control and deprivations, which 
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From criolla culture to a pattern of isolation
A central aim of the ‘New Prison Culture’ was to get rid of the old habits of the traditional or 
‘criolla’ prison culture, which was based on flexibility, as well as geographical and social 
integration. Borrowing the emic notion of criolla, broadly used by Colombians in everyday 
speech to mean ‘typical of our own land’ or ‘distinctive of our culture’, we define the criolla
prison culture as a set of culturally-embedded practices forged over the twentieth century 
that considerably improved quality of life behind bars by limiting the depersonalization and 
the desocialization inherent to imprisonment, despite dreadful conditions of infrastructure 
deterioration, poor management, corruption and insecurity. Criolla carceral culture can be 
defined by four characteristics: firstly, prisoners’ communal and self-managed lifestyle; 
secondly, a significant margin of dialogue and negotiation between the prison population 
and the prison management; thirdly, the preservation of regular and intimate contact with 
family (notably through a sort of ‘open day’ each week-end, with tens of thousands of 
visitors, including children, entering for long hours the living spaces of prisoners); and 
fourthly, the geographical location of the prisons in accessible sites within urban areas.
Criolla prisons were certainly designed to punish penal offenders, but not to radically 
exclude them from society. The New Prison Culture’s blueprint of isolation abruptly 
collided with this older institutional framework and represented a dramatic change, as it 
inaugurated an unprecedented phase of extremely severe control and deprivations, which 
precisely targeted the destruction of ‘permissive‘ criolla habits, operating over several 
spatial scales: regional (location of the prisons in or outside of urban areas), local 
(transformations of the space of the prison itself) and micro-spatial (social interaction, 
practices and regulations of everyday life in prisons).
First, the new model targeted the previous pattern of social and geographical integration of 
the prison system within Colombian society. Thus, two apparently contradictory dynamics 
rose simultaneously during this period: there was on one hand, an unprecedented growth 
in the number of correctional facilities and of the prison population; and on the other hand, 
the carceral archipelago was rendered invisible, by being extracted from cities and
relocated in remote rural areas (Figure 1). This deurbanisation was particularly acute in the 
region of Bogota. There, between 2003 and 2011, seven new prisons were built within a 
200 km radius of the capital, providing 14.400 beds, - an additional capacity of beds 2.5 
higher than that of the three criolla prisons of Bogota, where prisoners had been 
concentrated for decades8 (figure 2). Consequently, prisoners’ contact with their families 
was not only weakened through a dramatic reduction of ‘visiting rights’, but also as a result 
of the physical distance separating them from their family, lovers and friends.
       
8 The three criolla prisons in Bogota are still among the most overcrowded facilities of Colombia, with an 
average overpopulation rate of approximately 100%. More generally, the 128 criolla ‘1st generation’ prisons 
that are still functioning in Colombia bear the bulk of the huge overcrowding of the whole prison system, 
since they provide 60% of the national capacity (‘beds’ available), but hold 74% of the national prison 
population (figures: INPEC 2013, INPEC 2014). 
New prison facilies in Colombia since 2000
2nd generaon high security prisons (opened 
between 2000 and 2003) - approx. 1,600 
3nd generaon prisons (opened between 2010 
and 2011) - up to 4,300 inmates
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figure 1
Map of the new prisons built af r 2000
in Colombia with the advice of
the US Federal Bureau of Prisons
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precisely targeted the destruction of ‘permissive‘ criolla habits, operating over several 
spatial scales: regional (location of the prisons in or outside of urban areas), local 
(transformations of the space of the prison itself) and micro-spatial (social interaction, 
practices and regulations of everyday life in prisons).
First, the new model targeted the previous pattern of social and geographical integration of 
the prison system within Colombian society. Thus, two apparently contradictory dynamics 
rose simultaneously during this period: there was on one hand, an unprecedented growth 
in the number of correctional facilities and of the prison population; and on the other hand, 
the carceral archipelago was rendered invisible, by being extracted from cities and
relocated in remote rural areas (Figure 1). This deurbanisation was particularly acute in the 
region of Bogota. There, between 2003 and 2011, seven new prisons were built within a 
200 km radius of the capital, providing 14.400 beds, - an additional capacity of beds 2.5 
higher than that of the three criolla prisons of Bogota, where prisoners had been 
concentrated for decades8 (figure 2). Consequently, prisoners’ contact with their families 
was not only weakened through a dramatic reduction of ‘visiting rights’, but also as a result 
of the physical distance separating them from their family, lovers and friends.
Second, the new model transformed the prison itself, with the introduction of a series of 
architectural and regulative standards emulating the Coleman prison in Florida: the 
construction of separate self-contained housing blocks (intended to easily suppress any 
kind of unrest by the prisoners and to prevent the propagation of protests to other housing 
blocks); the use of massive grey cement structures to create an austere atmosphere of 
punishment and obedience; the introduction of individual or dual occupancy cells; and of a
series of security devices, such as generalized video surveillance and glass-separated 
visitors’ parlors. In addition, a ‘Security Housing Unit’ wing was constructed in each prison, 
better known in the US as supermax. In Colombia, the supermax was renamed the 
‘Special Treatment Unit’ (Unidad de Tratamiento Especial – UTE), designed to hold 
allegedly dangerous or recalcitrant prisoners for short or long term solitary confinement, as 
a means of disciplinary punishment.
Third, transferring the US prison to Colombia was also about promoting new practices and 
rules at a micro-level within the new carceral spaces. Prescribing what kind of disciplinary 
regime had to be implemented and how to behave in the high security prisons was 
considered by the BOP as important as the construction of the prisons themselves. 
Therefore, precise instructions on how to run US-inspired facilities were transmitted 
through training manuals and practical sessions for the warders and the administrative 
staff. If supermax is the ultra-punitive script turned into stone, we here have, to use 
Akrich’s (1992) words again, the pre-scriptions about the correct use of this new type of 
carceral architecture in Colombia. According to the US experts’ team, the cultural
transformation of the prison system had to occur through the implementation of efficient 
administrative and operational procedures that were translated word by word from US 
training books to create new manuals at the Colombian National Penitentiary School
(INPEC, 2002). The administrative staff and the warders were thus taught ‘New Prison 
Techniques’ borrowed from US correctional protocols. New Special Forces created by the 
US advisors – the Immediate Response Group (GRI) and the Special Escort Corps 
(CORES) – were trained according to US security methods, including brutal use of force to 
       
8 The three criolla prisons in Bogota are still among the most overcrowded facilities of Colombia, with an 
average overpopulation rate of approximately 100%. More generally, the 128 criolla ‘1st generation’ prisons 
that are still functioning in Colombia bear the bulk of the huge overcrowding of the whole prison system, 
since they provide 60% of the national capacity (‘beds’ available), but hold 74% of the national prison 
population (figures: INPEC 2013, INPEC 2014). 
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(CORES) – were trained according to US security methods, including brutal use of force to 
subdue recalcitrant individuals or groups. Warders in watchtowers were armed with large-
caliber weapons. The practices and clothing of prison guards were modeled on the military
and camouflage uniforms replaced civilian clothes. Militarization became, de facto, a key 
aspect of good understanding and smooth communication between US experts and local 
staff, the Colombian prison administration having long been trained according to military 
organizational and operational frames. For decades, the highest posts of the penitentiary 
administration had been exclusively assigned to high-ranking members of the army or the 
police, from the Director-General of the INPEC to the wardens of the main prisons of the 
country. As the former chief of the Civil Engineering Office of the INPEC stressed: 
‘We have always had a military profile at the top [of the INPEC]. And the military 
forces have worked for years under the lead of the Americans, so they master their 
language; they immediately know how to execute the instructions and procedures’9.
Toughening of the procedures was also reflected in the treatment of prisoners. Warders 
were instructed to bre k with the ‘bad habits’ of the criolla prison culture, such as talking to 
the prisoners or greeting them with a handshake. Unprecedented interventions on the 
body of the prisoners were introduced, such as the use of US-inspired orange uniforms, 
the compulsory shaving of heads and facial hair and the binding of hands and feet while 
being moved out of the housing block. 
In sum then, the planned elimination of the criolla system was through the combined action 
of a new penal policy, geographical location, architectural standard and training program of 
staff.
The failure of the policy transfer
However, things did not work out the way the BOP and the local transfer agents originally 
expec ed. Taking stock of the evolution of the Colombian prison system over the last 15 
years, the gap between the initial script of the US model and the reality of the ‘New Prison 
Culture’ is striking. Whilst th  pattern of isolation did have an important and long-term 
impact on Colombian prisons and prisoners, the radical change to flawless order and 
absolute control within the prison system did not occur. In this last section, we suggest a 
set of explanations as to why this policy-cum-architectural transfer failed and analyze what 
were nonetheless the effects of the prison reform. 
The reform failed to the extent that it did not succeed in reaching its proclaimed objectives 
for a series of institutional and political reasons. From the beginning of the transfer 
process, due to the differences in the formal rules between the US and Colombian 
penitentiary systems, the BOP experts had to adapt to local conditions that limited their 
capacity to manoeuvre. For example, a lack of finance in the Colombian penitentiary 
sector restricted the installation of technological security devices, and prevented increases 
in the number of warders; while the relatively restrictive Colombian legal framework limited 
the use of force inside prisons, in comparison with the US. 
Moreover, beyond this initial adaptation process, none of the announced goals of the
reform, such as getting the ISO 9000 certification in high security facilities or ending 
overcrowding, have become a reality. Over the years, the new prisons – that were initially 
proudly presented as a successful symbol of modernization – proved to be plagued with 
       
9 Interview with prison architect and former chief of the Civil Engineering Office of the Colombian National 
Institute of Prisons INPEC, Bogota, 20.05.2011. 
figure 2
The deurbanisation of the prison system :
map of the prison facilities built since 2003 
within a 200 km radius of Bogota.
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subdue recalcitrant individuals or groups. Warders in watchtowers were armed with large-
caliber weapons. The practices and clothing of prison guards were modeled on the military
and camouflage uniforms replaced civilian clothes. Militarization became, de facto, a key 
aspect of good understanding and smooth communication between US experts and local 
staff, the Colombian prison administration having long been trained according to military 
organizational and operational frames. For decades, the highest posts of the penitentiary 
administration had been exclusively assigned to high-ranking members of the army or the 
police, from the Director-General of the INPEC to the wardens of the main prisons of the 
country. As the former chief of the Civil Engineering Office of the INPEC stressed: 
‘We have always had a military profile at the top [of the INPEC]. And the military 
forces have worked for years under the lead of the Americans, so they master their 
language; they immediately know how to execute the instructions and procedures’9.
Toughening of the procedures was also reflected in the treatment of prisoners. Warders 
were instructed to break with the ‘bad habits’ of the criolla prison culture, such as talking to 
the prisoners or greeting them with a handshake. Unprecedented interventions on the 
body of the prisoners were introduced, such as the use of US-inspired orange uniforms, 
the compulsory shaving of heads and facial hair and the binding of hands and feet while 
being moved out of the housing block. 
In sum then, the planned elimination of the criolla system was through the combined action 
of a new penal policy, geographical location, architectural standard and training program of 
staff.
The failure of the policy transfer
However, things did not work out the way the BOP and the local transfer agents originally 
expected. Taking stock of the evolution of the Colombian prison system over the last 15 
years, the gap between the initial script of the US model and the reality of the ‘New Prison 
Culture’ is striking. Whilst the pattern of isolation did have an important and long-term 
impact on Colombian prisons and prisoners, the radical change to flawless order and 
absolute control within the prison system did not occur. In this last section, we suggest a
set of explanations as to why this policy-cum-architectural transfer failed and analyze what 
were nonetheless the effects of the prison reform. 
The reform failed to the extent that it did not succeed in reaching its proclaimed objectives 
for a series of institutional and political reasons. From the beginning of the transfer 
process, due to the differences in the formal rules between the US and Colombian 
penitentiary systems, the BOP experts had to adapt to local conditions that limited their 
capacity to manoeuvre. For example, a lack of finance in the Colombian penitentiary 
sector restricted the installation of technological security devices, and prevented increases 
in the number of warders; while the relatively restrictive Colombian legal framework limited 
the use of force inside prisons, in comparison with the US. 
Moreover, beyond this initial adaptation process, none of the announced goals of the
reform, such as getting the ISO 9000 certification in high security facilities or ending 
overcrowding, have become a reality. Over the years, the new prisons – that were initially 
proudly presented as a successful symbol of modernization – proved to be plagued with 
problems of poor construction, endemic malfunctions and human rights abuses. From the 
       
9 Interview with prison architect and former chief of the Civil Engineering Office of the Colombian National 
Institute of Prisons INPEC, Bogota, 20.05.2011. 
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late 2000s onward, the negative image of the prison system was such that the Colombian
government even stopped mentioning the ‘New Prison Culture’ policy or the collaboration 
with the BOP in any official document or public intervention.
The predicted profound cultural transformation of the penitentiary world did not materialize 
either. In this regard, the informal dimension of institutional embeddedness 
(Faulconbridge, 2012: 340) played a great role. The cultural habits of the criolla prison
were a key factor that inhibited a full conversion to the US blueprint of radical isolation, 
draconian rules and strict control. This blueprint collided with deeply rooted practices such 
as the strong communal life style among the prisoners, the broad visiting rights for families 
and friends and the leeway for negotiation between the prisoners and the prison 
management (de Dardel 2013: 194). Thus, in the sixteen prisons inspired by Coleman (all 
of which including supermax units), where a fourth of the Colombian prison population live 
today, the severe regime instituted by the US advisers continue to apply, but it has been 
broadly infiltrated by the practices and unofficial norms of criolla culture, especially after 
repeated prisoners’ protests and acts of resistance (de Dardel, 2013: 188-195), which 
received the support of Colombian Human Rights NGOs denouncing the trumpeted ‘New 
Prison Culture’ as a totalitarian nightmare. Furthermore, the ‘New Prison Culture’ did not 
take hold in the vast majority of old prisons. In those jails, thousands of prisoners 
overcrowded in dilapidated and insalubrious facilities continue to live according to criolla
carceral culture; they have never known the US model, except through hearsay. In sum 
then, the universe of the Colombian prison institution has become a dual system in which 
two contradictory penitentiary cultures coexist.
These institutional differences are augmented by political reasons for the failure, resulting 
from the divergent interpretation of the script according to the particular interests of each 
government, but also from a lack of political will to make sustainable improvements in the 
prison sector. Since the beginning, the objectives of the US government were clearly 
related to their agenda in the ‘war on drugs’. As soon as the program stopped serving their 
interests (i.e. after the extradition of hundreds of drug traffickers), they abandoned the 
collaboration. After the BOP left the country in 2005, Washington erased the prison sector 
from its broad program of intervention in Colombia, even excluding the creation of a follow-
up mechanism to monitor the high security and supermax prisons in the country. 
Additionally, exclusively concerned with security issues, neither the American nor the 
Colombian government ever had the intention to include in the reform process essential 
elements to address the mismanagement of the prison system: corruption; lack of basic 
health assistance and educational programs; privileges for organized crime bosses, white 
collar criminals and high ranking army officers; as well as practices of torture and human 
rights violations. Even more importantly, on the Colombian government side, there was an 
inherent contradiction between the proclaimed goal of solving the overcrowding of the 
prison population by building new prisons and the simultaneous active planning of a 
quantitative explosion of the prison population. The priorities of the Colombian authorities 
had thus increasingly diverged from their ambitions of order and modernity to focus on the 
management of mass imprisonment.
If the reform failed to meet its objectives, significant transformations in the world of 
Colombian prisons have however taken place. First, indicators of violence in prisons have 
reduced during Plan Colombia: the number of violent deaths (essentially homicides by 
firearms), along with the mortality rate, declined steadily between 2000 and 2008. Second, 
while for many years power had been in the hands of inmates involved in organized crime 
and drug trafficking, to a large extent, the state has been able to regain control and 
authority inside the prison system. However, how much the US inspired prison reform
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contributed to this evolution is highly uncertain. Credit for such change cannot be fully 
attributed to the US ultra-punitive prison model, as it is likely that these indicators would 
have improved anyway. Indeed, the high rates of violence in prisons at the end of the 
1990s was a reflection, or an extension of, the generalized violence in Colombia caused 
by the intensification of the armed conflict, widespread paramilitary terror, the uncontested 
power of drug lords, and a weakening of state authority. It is likely therefore that the 
registered drop in the prison homicide rate after 2000 mostly reflects the end of a 
particularly bloody episode in Colombian history rather than a change in prison policies. 
Second, the introduction of the US prison model led to the partial imposition of a new 
blueprint of totalitarian control aiming to radically isolate prisoners geographically and 
socially. This bedrock of the US model was reflected in the architectural design but also in 
the prison policies prescribed by the BOP experts. The location of correctional facilities in 
remote and inaccessible areas, the broad use of transfers which sent prisoners hundreds 
or even thousands of kilometers away from their place of origin, and the strengthening of 
militarization, all contributed to a situation of disconnection and social disaffiliation among 
prisoners. In this regard, the deurbanization of the prison system that goes hand in hand 
with the move towards mass incarceration will have long-term consequences that we 
discuss in our conclusion.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the travel to Colombia of the US prison policies and in particular 
the ‘supermax’ prison – the architectural icon of US ultra-punitive penal policy. Our 
analysis provides an understanding of how, on the basis of US policy and architectural 
models, such transnational relations transformed Colombia’s penal and carceral cultures. 
It also explains how the planned revolution of Colombian prison system through the ‘New 
Prison Culture’ reform eventually largely failed. Although our goal in this paper is mainly 
empirical, this story also addresses interesting methodological questions relating to the 
phenomena of policy and built form mobility, which are usually analyzed in two largely 
unconnected research fields. Therefore, our conclusion first returns to the questions posed 
in our introduction. How do policies and forms complement each other? Do they follow the 
same routes? Are they put in circulation by the same actors? We then briefly reflect on two 
often neglected aspects in such processes: power asymmetries and failures.
Built forms make policies tangible and durable. Looking at the connections between penal 
policy reform and new prison architecture highlights how new strategies of the state are 
inscribed in tangible forms and how this allows us to better grasp the effects of policies on 
mentalities, bodies and daily lives. In the reverse direction, connecting forms with the 
policies – or scripts – from which they stem gives us a better idea of what built forms do: it 
unveils their pedagogical program (Söderström and Geertman, 2013). Like Latour’s (1991)
technology, built forms are also ‘society made durable’: they disclose the obduracy of 
policies even after their apparent death. Thus, supermax prisons have continued – through 
their location and spatial organization – to shape Colombian carceral culture after the end 
of the penal collaboration with the US, even though criolla practices have crept back into 
these prisons. Because built forms perpetuate the effects of policies beyond their lifetime,
so to speak, it is heuristically very fruitful to make connections between analyses of policy 
mobility and architectural mobilities.
Policies and built forms follow distinct but intersecting circuits. Built forms have their 
specific circuits of circulation related to the reach and networks of architectural firms, as 
well as to the influence of journals and architectural schools (Knox and Taylor, 2005;
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Faulconbridge, 2010; Guggenheim and Söderström 2010). They differ from inter-municipal 
policy networks organized around mayoral meetings, bilateral cooperation or large city 
networks such as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). Moreover, if journals and 
academics play an important role in architectural circuits, international conferences and 
fieldtrips play an important role as ‘global micro-spaces’ for urban policies. However, our 
analysis of the travel of supermax shows that these circuits also intersect: actors involved 
in prison and criminal policy and prison architecture meet at the conferences of the 
International Corrections and Prisons Association. To advance our understanding of how 
space is produced in a global arena, systematic comparisons between these different 
circuits would thus be needed. 
More generally, the convergences and divergences between these forms of mobility 
should encourage us to move towards fuller analyses of the relational production of urban 
space. In order to do that, we need to reduce the barriers between research fields such as 
studies of policy, architectural and planning mobility. Each of these fields identifies 
different logics of relational space production implying different circuits, actors and 
motivations. A systematic comparison of these logics would provide us with a better 
understanding of how places develop through different ‘politics of relatedness’ 
(Söderström 2014).
To conclude, returning to our case-study, the analysis of the rise and fall of supermax 
highlights two neglected aspects of such relational processes of space production: power 
and failure. While symbolic, economic and political power asymmetries in policy and 
architectural mobility studies are rarely addressed, our case-study shows how central they 
often are in the way models circulate. The creation of the sort of enclave of foreign rule 
that took place within Plan Colombia is difficult to imagine in the North-North policy 
relations predominant in the literature, but it is far from exceptional when North-South 
relations are considered. Finally, as this case shows and Jacobs (2012: 419) argues, it is a 
mistake in a period where ‘best practice talk’ is so influential to disregard what we can 
learn from failed transfers and their very real consequences.
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